

**The Multinational Logistics Joint Task Force  
(MLJTF)**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## **Abstract**

The Multinational Logistics Joint Task Force (MLJTF), by LTC Matthew Higginbotham, United States Army, 49 pages.

Currently the United States is involved in providing logistics support to multinational stability operations around the world. Synchronizing support to US and coalition forces not only requires planners to integrate the different strategic, operational and tactical logistics doctrine of each participant, but to determine the optimal logistics organizations required to support multinational operations. The complexities of integrating US joint and multinational logistics support to stability operations in the absence of a fixed, US multinational logistics organization remains a significant challenge for logistics planners. This difference in stability operations logistics doctrine is due to many factors, but primarily to national constraints of logistics authority, which impact logistics planning and the CJTF commander's ability to achieve unity of effort across logistics in the Joint Area of Operations (JOA). Therefore, assuming there are no changes to multinational stability operations logistics doctrine in the near future, how does a US CJTF commander best integrate joint and multinational logistics operations for future US lead stability operations?

In this monograph, by analyzing the UN, NATO and the US Army's evolving Modular Logistics Doctrine, the author integrates the key areas from each doctrine into a multinational logistics joint task force (MLJTF) organization. The MLJTF is a separate logistics joint task force whose commander reports to the CJTF commander, and is responsible for executing, synchronizing, and coordinating theater logistics during a given stability operation. By analyzing UN, NATO and future US modular logistics doctrine, the author concludes that, regardless of current US title 10 and coalition national authority constraints, commanders and logisticians must organize the optimal logistics organization that provides the CJTF commander a clear picture of logistics in his JOA. Properly resourced with joint and multinational resources, the MLJTF could be tailored to support future small or large scale stability operations.

The author recommends that the MLJTF is the optimal logistics structure designed to support US joint / multinational stability operations. The MLJTF concept is a way to think about future logistics support, which is tailored to bridge UN and NATO gaps in supporting coalition forces operating under different doctrines. By providing the CJTF commander a separate logistics JTF, it allows him to delegate logistics command and control to a single commander responsible for synchronizing theater logistics. The MLJTF provides the CJTF commander a mechanism for executing logistics authority, streamlining logistics planning (through the distribution management center (DMC)), and achieving logistics unity of effort by filtering JOA logistics requirements, capabilities and shortfalls into a common picture for CJTF commanders. This monograph provides future Army / Joint planners a method of providing support to multifunctional stability operations.

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## INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, US Army logistics doctrine has evolved to support a transforming Army. In the *2006 US Army Game Plan*, the CSA emphasized in the Army Vision that, “the Army will be organized into modular forces, rapidly deployable, full-spectrum, networked, adaptive, and more powerful, enabling joint and expeditionary operations with interagency and multinational partners.”<sup>1</sup> To accomplish this, and according to CASCOM’s *Draft Modular Force Logistics Concept (version 5)*, “Army logisticians must create a logistics structure capable of providing a single command and control, and end-to-end architecture from strategic to foxhole...and creating interdependencies among services to achieve greater efficiencies.”<sup>2</sup> Therefore, what is the optimal logistics organization designed to support US stability operations? To answer this question, this paper attempts to first analyze the UN and NATO logistics doctrine regarding logistics authority, logistics planning and unity of effort during stability operations, and then apply the relevant practices to a US Multinational Logistics Joint Task Force (MLJTF), using current US Army *Modular Force Logistics Concept* doctrine.

Historically, the US has struggled with determining the most effective logistics structure required to support stability operations. For example, in the *1993 Center for Army Lessons Learned Report from Operation RESTORE HOPE*, a significant logistics lesson learned was, “Operation RESTORE HOPE marked the first time in modern military history that an Army Corps Support Command (COSCOM) was given the mission to provide theater-level logistics to

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<sup>1</sup>CSA, SMA, Secretary of the Army, *United States Army 2006 Game Plan: Accelerating Momentum* (1 May 2006), 2.

<sup>2</sup>US Army Combined Arms Support Command, *Modular Force Logistics Concept (Version 5)* (Draft) (28 April 2006), 7.

a joint and later combined command....How to best handle logistics for a joint/combined force is still uncertain.”<sup>3</sup> Today’s US military logistics planners must understand the complexities of providing support to multinational forces well prior to deploying and executing stability operations.

Currently, the UN, NATO and the United States have different logistics doctrines and organizations for supporting stability operations. Assuming the US will once again participate in future US lead stability operations, what is the optimal US logistics force structure required, and what can logistics planners learn from UN and NATO doctrine to integrate into future US stability operations logistics organizations?

The United States has participated in UN sanctioned stability operations around the world. During these operations, strategic logistics planners have been repeatedly challenged with determining the optimal logistics support structure required to support joint and combined (multinational) operations. Providing logistics support to coalition forces not only required planners to integrate the different strategic, operational and tactical logistics doctrine of each participant, but to determine the optimal logistics organization required to support these operations. This paper demonstrates that a US multinational logistics joint task force (MLJTF), properly resourced with joint, multinational and multi-agency capability, provides coalition joint task force commanders (CJTF) with the optimal logistics organization capable of supporting future US joint and multinational stability operations.

The author analyzes current logistics doctrines and structures of the UN and NATO, and then determines what areas US logistics planners may integrate into the current US modular logistics force structure to provide an optimal support organization for stability operations. Additionally, the author justifies the need for a MLJTF organization by analyzing the current

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<sup>3</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report” (15



stability operations logistics doctrine and structures of the UN and NATO, and how they may apply to a US MLJTF command and staff structure. However, prior to the analysis of UN and NATO stability operations logistics doctrine, the following terms need defining: multinational logistics joint task force (MLJTF), joint logistics, lead nation, multinational logistics (MNL), force logistics support group (FLSG), and the multinational joint logistics center (MJLC).

The multinational logistics joint task force (MLJTF) is the author's recommended concept that provides the optimal US logistics organization required to support future stability operations. The MLJTF integrates the best logistics practices from the UN, NATO and current US stability operations logistics doctrine. It also provides the CJTF commander with a single logistics operator and manager of joint and multinational logistics in a stability operations environment.

Joint logistics has emerged in US joint doctrine and is a principal concept in stability operations doctrine. *Joint Publication 4-08: Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations* defines joint logistics as, "The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistics operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more military departments of the same nation."<sup>4</sup> Synchronizing joint logistics is fundamental to MLJTF operations by ensuring it has the proper joint expertise to manage joint and multinational operations under a single command.

The lead nation concept is used by multinational partners in stability operations. *Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations* defines lead nation as, "One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistics support for

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November 1993), V-2.

<sup>4</sup>Joint Pub 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations* (25 Sep 2002), GL-10.

all or part of the multinational force and/or headquarters.”<sup>5</sup> In UN sanctioned stability operations, the US will most likely assume the lead nation concept if it provides the majority of forces. Therefore, as lead nation, the US must have sufficient command and control of all logistics operations in the JOA.

Multinational Logistics (MNL) is used throughout this paper. Joint Pub 4-08 defines multinational logistics as, “Any coordinated logistics activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those under United Nations mandate.”<sup>6</sup> Operating in a MNL environment is extremely complex due to the headquarters staff personnel requirements and expertise required to execute MNL logistics operations.

The force logistics support group (FLSG) is a UN logistics headquarters structure, designed to be operated by a lead nation. UN doctrine defines the FLSG as “a logistics support concept where the UN finds a member state, or states to accept the responsibility of forming the FLSG...the FLSG will incorporate logistics units from other participating nations referred to by the UN to National Support Elements (NSEs).”<sup>7</sup> The FLSG is a headquarters template used by the UN to transfer over to a lead nation to resource and implement. It requires a commander and highly versatile staff, made up of interagency and multinational representatives. The FLSG is discussed in Chapter 2.

The multinational joint logistics center (MJLC) is NATO’s logistics organization. NATO doctrine defines the MJLC as, “A NATO designated logistics organization for coordinating and managing multinational force (MNF) logistics...The United States has endorsed NATO logistics

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<sup>5</sup>Joint Pub 4-08, GL-10.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., GL-12.

doctrine and it's concept of the MJLC.”<sup>8</sup> The MJLC has no commander, but a multinational logistics management center with multinational representatives. Command and control of logistics is primarily through the CJTF J4, who provides direction to multiple military logistics units. The MJLC is discussed in Chapter 3. Next, the author defines the criteria used to analyze UN and NATO logistics doctrine.

The author analyzes the criteria of logistics authority, logistics planning and unity of effort in relation to UN and NATO logistics doctrine and their respective organizations. These three criteria must be integrated throughout all operations to ensure commanders have positive logistics command and control throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The lessons learned from the UN and NATO, as well as current logistics operations from the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, are analyzed with respect to the three criteria, and integrated into the author's recommended MLJTF logistics organization.

The *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* states that, “Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics, and may delegate this authority to the JTF for common support capability within the JOA.”<sup>9</sup> The first criterion, logistics authority, is important when analyzing the logistics doctrine of the UN and NATO, because most stability operations involve joint and multinational forces. In *Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support for Multinational Operations*, it states, “In multinational operations, the multinational force commander (MNFC) must be given sufficient authority over logistics resources to ensure that operational priorities can be effectively supported. However, the MNFC should have the authority to redistribute logistics assets as a temporary expedient to meet unanticipated

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<sup>7</sup>Headquarters Department of the Army, *DA Pamphlet 700-31, Commander's Handbook Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: 1 July 1994), 5.

<sup>8</sup>Joint Pub 4-08, II-9.

<sup>9</sup>Joint Warfighting Center, *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (16 June 1997), VI-2.

situations.”<sup>10</sup> Unless the combatant commander has logistics authority, he has no way of synchronizing the logistics effort in the JOA. *Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support for Multinational Operations* also states, “MNFCs typically do not have the same degree of authority over MNF logistics as commanders of national operations. Nations give MNFCs only as much authority over their national resources as they are willing to concede to achieve national objectives in the operation.”<sup>11</sup> Therefore, when operating in multinational stability operations, US military commanders and logisticians must proactively work logistics authority links to facilitate a clear understanding of the execution of multinational logistics. By analyzing stability operations logistics doctrine, the author will determine that even though current national regulations constrain how a CJTF commander exercises logistics authority, logistics planners must synchronize logistics planning to reduce the CJTF commander’s logistics risks.

The next criterion is logistics planning. *JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support for Joint Operations* describes logistics planning as, “The coordination of logistics implications at all levels; multinational, national, service, theater, service and functional component, as well as supporting command.”<sup>12</sup> This criterion will focus on how UN and NATO forces are structured to conduct stability operations logistics planning. Specifically, what does UN and NATO logistics doctrine state about the logistics planning process; who is involved, and is logistics planning effective to accomplish the CJTF commander’s mission? Based on this analysis, the author demonstrates how the lessons from UN and NATO logistics planning integrate with the US MLJTF planning process.

The last criterion is unity of effort. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, states the following regarding unity of effort, “Unity of effort requires coordination and

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<sup>10</sup>Joint Pub 4-08, I-7.

<sup>11</sup>Joint Pub 4-08, I-9.

cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command.”<sup>13</sup> Achieving unity of effort is critical to the CJTF commander in stability operations because it allows him the ability to integrate all aspects of logistics planning preparation and execution throughout the JOA. The JCS J4 stated, “Unity of effort refers to the coordinated application of all logistics capabilities to focus on the JFC’s intent. It is the most critical of all logistics outcomes. Achieving unity of effort requires the optimal integration of joint, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental logistics capabilities.”<sup>14</sup> This criterion focuses on how the UN and NATO logistics doctrine integrate joint, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental logistics capabilities to achieve unity of effort during CJTF stability operations. The author analyzes how lessons from UN and NATO forces organize logistics organizations to achieve unity of effort during MLJTF operations. He then integrates the most effective lessons of unity of effort principals into the US MLJTF organization. Additionally, the author addresses how lack of unity of effort results in inaccurate logistics visibility and tracking of logistics systems throughout the JOA.

Therefore, by analyzing and then integrating the different logistics doctrine, principles and structures of the UN and NATO into a separate US MLJTF, the author argues how the MLJTF is the optimal US logistics force structure required to command and control US led, joint

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<sup>12</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support for Joint Operations*, (6 April 2000), III-2.

<sup>13</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (14 November 2000), B-2.

<sup>14</sup>C. V. Christianson, “Joint Logistics: Shaping our Future, A Personal Perspective,” *US Army Logistician*, (July-August 2006): 3.

and multinational logistics operations. This final conclusion is derived from the UN, NATO and ISAF lessons learned, as described at the end of each chapter.

This monograph is organized into four Chapters. The introduction provides the background of the research question with hypothesis and criteria. It introduces the reader to the different forms of stability operation logistics doctrine, defines critical multinational logistics terms, and states the criteria in validating the hypothesis. Next, the author analyzes the UN stability operations logistics doctrine and organization, followed by the doctrine's complexities, specifically the UN's FLSG logistics organization. Additionally, by understanding UN logistics doctrine, US logistics planners will better understand how to integrate UN logistic operations into US operations. Following the analysis of the UN, the author transitions to NATO stability operations logistics doctrine and organization, and provides an analysis of NATO's doctrine by analyzing the MJLC. The author then determines and integrates the lessons from the MJLC into US MLJTF operations. Lastly, the author combines the doctrinal and organizational lessons from the UN and NATO into the Multinational Logistics Joint Task Force (MLJTF) structure. The MLJTF is developed by integrating key components of the UN FLSG concept, the NATO MJLC concept, and current US Army modular force requirements. The purpose of this monograph is to provide US logistics planners a more joint, multinational, multi-agency, streamlined logistics organization, designed to provide the CJTF commander with positive logistics command and control for future stability operations.

## **UNITED NATIONS (UN) LOGISTICS DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURE**

According to the *Capstone Doctrine for UN Peacekeeping Operations (draft 2)*, "The system of UN logistics is not well-designed to support high tempo military operations. ...it is a reality that UN field operations continue to be constrained by complex bureaucratic procedures

conceived in a non-operational context.”<sup>15</sup> United Nations (UN) logistics doctrine is dependent on member nations assuming responsibility for multinational and national logistics. According to *US Army Peace Operations Doctrine*, “Logistics policies and procedures for both the UN and participating nations should be tailored for the specific mission. Planning, coordination, and agreements among participating nations are essential...The UN has only a small operational planning capability. A small staff of military officers from member nations assists the UN’s military advisor in logistics planning.”<sup>16</sup>

Since the UN is dependent on member nations for support and most stability operations are UN-sanctioned, lead nations for UN operations are responsible for understanding coalition authority guidelines in order to coordinate and cooperate with multinational forces. Additionally, member nations to UN operations must compete with UN requirements. *According to Joint Logistics to Multinational ...*, it states, “UN operations are characterized by the following: (1) they are conducted in accordance with UN policies, regulations, and procedures, which may not be familiar to US or other commanders. (2) Standardization and/or interoperability among troop contingents may be low due to the diverse mix of participating nations and lack of pre-operational multinational training. (3) UN operations are more likely to be ad hoc than operations conducted by regional alliances. (4) Participants and their logistic capabilities can vary widely, although some nations are specializing in UN operations and have substantial experience operating with each other.”<sup>17</sup> Regardless, it becomes critical for member nations to understand these logistics implications well prior to participating in UN operations. In this chapter the author analyzes UN logistics authority, logistics planning, and unity of effort in supporting stability operations to

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<sup>15</sup>Peacebuild–The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee Website (<http://www.peacebuild.ca/index.php3>, Authors, Challenges of Peace Operations Project. *Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Draft 2)* (July 2006), 35.

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 100-23, Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: 30 Dec 94), Chapter 4.

identify and apply the effective practices for use in a US multinational logistics joint task force (MLJTF) organization.

LTC Laurent Lena states in his article *The UN Logistics Doctrine*, “The number of NATO intervention has increased very much during the last decade. It is within that new context that dynamic drafting of new doctrines and procedures is being developed, especially in the domain of combat service support, which is an area where the notion of national responsibility remains essential.”<sup>18</sup> Since member nations participating in UN stability operations have logistics authority for their respective nations, how is the United Nations organized to manage logistics authority for UN stability operations?

The UN has no logistics authority over participating nations, only coordinating authority. The UN provides logistics authority coordination through its field operating division under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). *The Commander’s Handbook for Peacekeeping Operations* states, “Command is retained by the security council through the UN secretary General (SG) at UN Headquarters (UNHQ)...The Under Secretary General for PKOs (USG-PKO) is responsible for the Department of PKO (DPKO)...inside the DPKO is the field operating division (FOD) who coordinates all admin and logistics support of field missions.”<sup>19</sup> The FOD is a coordinating section that links the DPKO with the on-going logistics operations during stability operations. Therefore, if the FOD is only a management body, and the UN can only coordinate logistics authority, how does the UN execute logistics operations?

For UN sanctioned stability operations, UN doctrine states, “The UN logistics system relies on member states being self-sufficient at unit level for a given period, normally between 60

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<sup>17</sup>Joint Pub 4-08, I-15.

<sup>18</sup>LTC Laurent Lena, “The UN Logistics Doctrine,” *Forces Employment Doctrine* (CDEF - French), [www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine08/us/doctrine](http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine08/us/doctrine) (March 2006): 21.



to 120 days...After the self-sustaining period, the UN will normally provide a measure of continuing support through a system of Lead Nations, establish a Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG), a civilian contractual arrangement, or a combination of the above.”<sup>20</sup> The FLSG is the United Nation’s organization for coordinating the administrative and logistics effort during stability operations. A significant aspect of the FLSG structure is that it is a command and staff structure designed for a lead or volunteer nation to assume command and control (see figure 1).




Figure 1 - UN Force Logistics Support Group<sup>21</sup>

The Headquarters UN FLSG structure in figure 1 depicts an FLSG commander with a chief of staff (COS) and deputy chief of staff (DCOS). Notice how the logistics function of

<sup>19</sup>US Department of the Army, *DA Pamphlet 700-31, Commander's Handbook Peace Operations*, (Washington, DC: July 1994),1,45.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid. 2

movements is under the COS as opposed to the DCOS who controls the other logistics functions. This differs from US logistics organizations since most logistical expertise in US logistics organizations is under a single logistics operations section. Additionally, the DCOS is also responsible for civil affairs, finance, military and civilian police and religious affairs, which may interfere with the management of logistics. Also, the FLSG is task organized with each

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 7.

participating nation having a national support Cell (NSC). Since logistics authority is maintained by each member nation through their NSCs, an important aspect of the FLSG concept as stated in UN doctrine is, “One member nation would assume coordinating authority for the working of the FLSG while the other member nations provide National Support Cell to look to specific needs.”<sup>22</sup> Whichever Nation assumes the coordinating authority or commander of the FLSG works directly with the NSCs. This internal relationship is critical since each NSC has logistics authority to execute their respective nation’s logistics requirements. Additionally, the FSLG has a logistics commander in charge, thus enabling the FOD of the UN to rely on a single commander instead of a logistics staff section to provide the CJTF commander with critical logistics information. In his article, *Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science*, General (Retired) Gary Luck states, “Staff centric organizations lack clear commander guidance and intent enriched by the commander’s expertise and intuition.”<sup>23</sup> The UN FLSG is based on a command centric logistics organization. However, even though a nation volunteers as the lead nation to a UN stability operation, that nation may or may not adopt the FLSG command and staff structure. For example, in Operation Restore Hope (Somalia), the US military was the lead nation and assumed the UN FLSG support structure during a stability operation, but modified its headquarters based on mission requirements.

During Operation Restore Hope, the United States was the lead nation and assumed the UN FLSG mission to execute logistics authority. In order to accomplish this, the US military task organized all logistics operations for CJTF Somalia as a separate Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC) (see figure 2).

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<sup>22</sup>DA PAM 700-31, 9 (Annex IIIC).

<sup>23</sup>General (Ret) Gary Luck, “Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science,” *Joint Warfighting Center, US Joint Forces Command* (Sept 2006) 12.




Figure 2 - Operation Restore Hope JTFSC<sup>24</sup>

As depicted in figure 2, the JTFSC consisted of a small COSCOM headquarters organization with logistics commanders in command of the respective support brigades. According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Lessons Learned report, “The headquarters element of the JTFSC was from the 13th COSCOM as well as several primary staff sections...Despite the JTFSC proposals for a Joint staff, the JTFSC remained an all-army command.”<sup>25</sup> Even though a disadvantage of the JTFSC headquarters was its staff being primarily Army, the most important aspect of the JTFSC organization according to the lessons learned report was, “having the JTFSC provides the commander the ability to balance priorities

<sup>24</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned, JTFSC Organizational Chart,” (25 Sep 1998), Appendix F.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., IV-12.

for all Joint/Combined forces in theater.”<sup>26</sup> Additionally, the JTFSC had no NSCs in its structure. Even though the Army struggled with other US military services and multinational units in deconflicting joint logistics authority during Operation Restore Hope, the advantage of the JTFSG was it assigned a commander to oversee joint theater logistics and provided the CJTF Somalia commander a single point of contact for logistics. The JTFSC commander was able to execute “common user logistics” to all forces during the operation.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, given the UN has no logistics authority, and if the US is in a lead nation role, US military logistics planners must understand UN doctrine and the FLSG concept regarding logistics coordination and reporting. Understanding logistics authority is one consideration logistics planners consider when developing a support concept for stability operations. Given the FLSG model with multiple member nations, each with logistics authority, and two channels of reporting (one through CJTF the other through the UN), how does the UN conduct logistics planning for stability operations?

The *Doctrine for Logistics Support for Joint Operations* describes the concept of logistics planning as, “The coordination of logistics implications at all levels: multinational, national, service, theater, service and functional component, as well as supporting command.”<sup>28</sup> The UN has no logistics authority over participating Nations, but is always faced with coordinating all logistics aspects of a supported CJTF. According to UN Doctrine, “Member nations provide logistics experts to work in the FOD. Depending on the circumstances, the FOD may also operate a logistics coordination center (LCC) and/or a movement’s coordination center (MCC)...

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., IV-13.

<sup>27</sup>Common user logistics is defined in JP-4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations*, 25 Sept 2002, page GL-6 is: Material or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, DOD agency, non-DOD agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation.

<sup>28</sup>Joint Pub 4-0, III-2.

The chief logistics officer (CLO) is a military staff member of the Force HQ and chosen from among the countries contributing contingents for the PKO. The CLO is normally the senior logistics commander and likely the commander of the FLSG.”<sup>29</sup>

Assuming the CLO is the FLSG commander, he depends on the FLSG HQ to conduct logistics planning. In the initial stages of a UN stability operation and before establishing the FLSG, a UN PKO headquarters could look similar to Figure 3.




Figure 3 - (UN PKO Structure)<sup>30</sup>

Figure 3 is an example of how a UN PKO headquarters is structured for logistics planning. Logistics units are organized under the Office for Special Political Affairs (OSPA), and

<sup>29</sup>DA PAM 700-31, 3 and 5.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., Annex IIIA.

the Logistics branch organized under the chief of staff. The chart depicts an example UN PKO headquarters with positions filled by participating nations. The most important point of this chart is that logistics planning for UN multinational operations has political (interagency), multinational, technical, and operational staff requirements. Therefore, in a UN sanctioned, US led stability operation, logisticians must determine, along with the UN, which logistics functions contained in the UN PKO headquarters should be organized under the FLSG. It would appear more efficient for the logistics units to task organize under a separate logistics organization as opposed to merely a staff element, such as depicted in figure 3. The FLSG commander (and ultimately the UN FOD), are able to achieve synergy by having a multifunctional command and staff organization prepared to synchronize the logistics plan for both the CJTF commander and DPKO. Only when the FLSG headquarters has the required staff expertise and under the supervision of a chief of staff or executive officer can concurrent planning with the CJTF HQ occur and a synchronized plan be developed.

*US Doctrine for Logistics Support for Joint Operations* emphasizes that, “proper logistics planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and logistics improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and supporting commands.”<sup>31</sup> Based on the UN logistics planning requirements, a MLJTF must include NSCs, linkages with the DPKO, and synchronize logistics support for both UN and CJTF requirements. Given the complexities of UN logistics planning such as FLSG reporting channels, multinational and interagency staff representation, and NSC’s national logistics requirements and logistics authority, how does the FLSG commander achieve logistics unity of effort for the UN in support of stability operations, and what significant aspects of UN unity of effort practices can be integrated into a US MLJTF?

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<sup>31</sup>Joint Pub 4-0, III-2.

In his article, *The UN Logistics Doctrine*, LTC Lena states, “The UN has adopted an Integrated Support System which combines military and civilian logistics headquarters within a single support organization, under the control of a civilian administrator; centralizing the requirements constitutes the major principle of that structure.”<sup>32</sup> Depending on the type of stability operation and the conditions in the joint operational environment, the US may or may not have the luxury of having civilian administrators integrating the support. However, by integrating the support system, the UN may achieve unity of effort by centralizing all logistics requirements and resources, since the logistics effort is streamlined through the same reporting channels. This centralization would occur with the UN sanctioned lead nation who centralized all logistics information and then reported to the UN. Given the assumption that the US is the lead nation and assigned command of the FLSG, the UN would be able to conduct unity of effort through the FLSG by reporting to the CJTF commander and UN PKO. According to the *JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peacekeeping Operations*, “The creation of a single theater logistics command provides economy of assets and systems efficiency. Even if multinational participants insist upon maintaining a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort.”<sup>33</sup> Referring back to the FLSG organization in figure 1, it would appear that the FLSG commander requires a single staff section for logistics. As previously stated, the FLSG staff sections are intermixed under the Chief of Staff (COS) and Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS). By having a single logistics and administrative section, under the COS or DCOS, the organization may achieve more synergy and enable the commander to achieve better logistics unity of effort by consolidating the logistics status across the JOA.

Organizing all logistics sections under a single logistics section, such as a distribution management center (DMC), the FLSG commander achieves unity of effort by integrating

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<sup>32</sup>Lena, 21.



multinational, interagency, joint and operational expertise through the chief of staff to the CJTF commander and PKO. This rearrangement of staff expertise would provide the FLSG commander, with more unity of effort in providing the CJTF commander and UN FOD an understanding of the logistics requirements, capabilities and shortfalls. Additionally, by channeling the NSEs requirements through a single staff section, the FLSG commander could make decisions (if given the authority), that would reduce duplication of logistics efforts. Unless the NSCs information is channeled through a logistics staff section, the probability exists for logistics redundancy by ordering multiple common commodities. This ultimately leads to wasted man power, and the ordering and stockpiling of excess stocks. CW2 Dirk Sarr, in his article, *Making the Most of UN Logistics*, supports avoiding redundancy in logistics by stating, “Upon arriving in an area of operations, logistics personnel of participating countries must coordinate with UN logistics personnel to conduct a joint inventory of all supplies and equipment they have brought with them to support UN operations.”<sup>34</sup> By the FLSG quickly achieving control of the logistics footprint, the FLSG commander is quickly able to integrate the logistics effort, ultimately leading to unity of effort across the JOA. Having an understanding of logistics authority, planning and unity of effort, what information can US logistics planners apply to a US MLJTF organization?

UN logistics doctrine provides the US logistician with an understanding of the importance of the role of member nations and logistics authority. Member nations in UN operations maintain logistics authority over their respective forces. The advantage of the FLSG is that it has a single logistics commander in charge of logistics which streamlines command and control for both the UN and CJTF commander. If properly resourced with the necessary joint and

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<sup>33</sup>*Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peacekeeping Operations*, VI-12.

<sup>34</sup>CW2 Saar, J Dirk, “Making the Most of UN Logistics,” *Army Logistician Magazine* (Sept–Oct 1997) 1.

multinational personnel, this separate logistics organization would efficiently conduct logistics planning through both the UN PKO and CJTF commander. UN logistics planning is conducted in both FLSG and PKO organizations. Unity of effort is achieved by planning all logistics operations under one logistics operations section, to alleviate redundancy in ordering and managing of theater stocks. The UN must achieve unity of effort through a lead nation that assumes logistics command and control of the FLSG. It has no other means without using the resources of a lead nation. Therefore, the UN logistics doctrine and structure provide interesting insights in logistics authority, planning and unity of effort if the US is task as the lead nation to future stability operations.

## **NATO LOGISTICS DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURE**

According to NATO's *Backgrounder Magazine*; "After September 11, 2001, NATO could no longer afford to do logistics in the same way it did in the Balkans. It is now planning to be able to conduct out of area operations... not expecting host nation support, or civil military assistance from nations in the area it deploys. NATO already faces some of these limitations with the ISAF in Afghanistan...The force therefore is heavily dependent on airlift for movement, reinforcements and resupplies from the US and Russia."<sup>35</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom is the most current example of how NATO has evolved from supporting a static NATO organization within Europe, to a post cold war deployable logistics element. Not only is NATO currently the lead organization of OEF, but providing multinational logistics support for both partners and non-partners during this large scale stability operation. In this chapter the author will analyze NATO

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<sup>35</sup>Backgrounder: Logistics support for NATO Operations, Logistics for Afghanistan. NATO on-line Library, para 7, Feb 2006.

logistics doctrine, its structure and lessons learned in supporting stability operations to determine which areas are applicable to a US MLJTF.

Post cold war NATO logistics doctrine has rapidly emerged by aligning its logistics support into a deployable NATO force. However, NATO authority still depends on member nation responsibility. *The NATO Handbook* states, “Member nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for logistics support of NATO’s multinational operations. Each NATO military commander establishes logistics requirements and coordinates logistics planning and support within his area of responsibility.”<sup>36</sup> This logistics responsibility pertains to all NATO commanders involved in stability operations. NATO policy also states, according to *The NATO Handbook* that, “Cooperation and coordination among the nations and NATO authorities is essential. Moreover, logistics cooperation between the civilian and military sectors within and between nations must make the best use of limited resources.”<sup>37</sup> This becomes a critical priority for the NATO commander. His authority requires him to maintain constant dialogue with participating nations and a clear understanding of their respective policies in order to effectively integrate logistics. Poland’s integration with NATO provides a good example of the challenges faced by nations when joining NATO operations. According to the final report in *Integration Problems of the Military Logistics Systems of Poland and NATO*, it stated, “For instance, the notion of “Material” is within NATO understood in significantly larger sense than in Poland. Therefore, the meanings of “material acquisition policy,” “material supply policy,” or “material distribution policy” are quite different within NATO’s and Polish circles of logisticians.”<sup>38</sup> This simple difference becomes complex when now operating outside of NATO’s borders and trying

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<sup>36</sup>*The NATO Handbook*, 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition (Brussels Belgium 1998-1999), 173.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.* 173.

<sup>38</sup>COL Professor Włodzimierz Miszański, PHD. *The Integration Problems of the Military Logistics Systems of Poland and NATO* – Final Report (June 1998), 11.

to integrate the support concepts of multiple coalition partners in support of multinational stability operations.

Since NATO forces now have authority to operate beyond their borders, providing support to multinational partners and non-partners becomes even more critical. At the Senior Logisticians Conference (SNLC) in 1997, NATO logisticians agreed that, “Nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for logistics support of NATO’s multinational operations.”<sup>39</sup> This collective responsibility requires detailed staff coordination and logistics command and control of multiple nations. Since NATO uses the MJLC concept to now support out of area operations, how does the MJLC conduct logistics planning when operating as part of a CJTF?

According to NATO’s primary logistics doctrinal source, Allied Joint Publication -4(A) (AJP), “The NATO logistics concept at both the strategic and operational levels involves the interpretation of logistic principles through tailored structures, organizations and multinational interaction.”<sup>40</sup> NATO’s primary means of planning, preparing and executing logistics support for out of area multinational stability operations is through the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC). “The multinational joint logistics centre (MJLC), provides the means of co-coordinating support for participating nations, commands and organizations involved in any combined, joint operation or exercise.”<sup>41</sup> Figure 4 provides the MJLC organization.

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<sup>39</sup>Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference (SNLC). MC 319/1, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics (Final Draft) (March 1997), 2.

<sup>40</sup>Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine, AJP-4(A), NATO/EACP Unclassified publication (December 2003) 1-5.

<sup>41</sup>Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Doctrine (MJLC), AJP-4.6 (March 2002), 1-1.




Figure 4 - (MJLC)<sup>42</sup>

The MJLC is a modular staff organization that has multiple joint centers for the different components (land, air, maritime, and multinational). The MJLC is not a logistics unit, but a robust staff that augments the NATO CJ4 staff to provide the logistics expertise for both joint and multinational operations. In figure 4, the MJLC is organized under a Force Commander with a joint staff. According to AJP -4.6, “Within the overall C2 organization, the MJLC itself should be considered a module that is flexible in adapting to different requirements and C2 structures as the situation dictates.”<sup>43</sup> Since NATO has no fixed organic logistics units, the NATO commander provides logistics command and control of participating nations through the CJ4. However, LTC Mittuch argued, “To make the most effective use of these new capabilities and to efficiently manage the unique logistics requirements of a rapid reaction force operating outside

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., Figure 3-1.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 3-2.

Alliance, NATO should establish a standing multinational logistics command...To date, national considerations by Alliance members have precluded the implementation of every plan to create a rational logistics structure.”<sup>44</sup> LTC Mittuch argued that NATO should develop a multinational logistics command. The assumption is that this command would replace the robust CJ4 logistics staff by resourcing a logistics command built around the capability that currently exists in the MJLC. Since NATO’s logistics structure resides in the CJ4 staff in the MJLC, how does the NATO commander’s exercise logistics authority?

In the NATO headquarters, the primary logistics staff section is the CJ4. As shown in figure 4, the director of the MJLC works for the CJ4. AJP-4(A) states, “NATO logistics command and control is provided by the CJ4 and combined joint logistics staffs in static and deployed headquarters organizations such as the MJLC and single component equivalents such as Multinational Logistics Command/Centres (MNL).”<sup>45</sup> The MJLC under the CJ4 seems to add another staff layer between the respective nation’s logistics units to the NATO CJ4. However, because of logistics authority constraints such as participating nations being responsible for providing logistics support to their respective forces, and the lack of a NATO fixed logistics organizations, NATO is totally dependant on the MJLC to assume the role of a coordinating logistics headquarters. This is unless nations authorize the NATO commander logistics authority over their forces, in which case “multinational logistics support arrangements” are determined and the NATO commander, through the CJ4, execute based on the requirements of the support arrangements.<sup>46</sup> In figure 4, the Maritime component of a potential lead nation is responsible for

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<sup>44</sup>LTC Eugene W. Mittuch, “*Logistics Support for NATO’s New Strategic Concept: The Need for a Multinational Logistics Command*” (UNCLASSIFIED) Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department (13 May 2002) Abstract and page 4.

<sup>45</sup>Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine, 1-5.

<sup>46</sup>JP 4-08, Multinational logistics support arrangements as those arrangements such as Lead nation, National logistics Units for Multinational Support, Contractor support, Role specialist Nation, Host Nation

logistics, and reports to both the NATO force commander and the Deputy Director of the MJLC. This arrangement could cause command and control problems due to the force commander receiving different information from two sources. If the NATO commander is not allowed logistics authority over the respective participating nations, it would constrain his ability to prioritize the logistical effort. Given this constraint, how does this impact the NATO commander's ability to influence logistics?

According to AJP -4(A), "NATO commanders must be given sufficient authority over logistics resources to enable them to employ and sustain forces in the most effective manner. Authority must be aligned with responsibility...he must also be given the authority to prioritize his support so as to ensure he can accomplish the mission."<sup>47</sup> Additionally, AJP-4(A) also states, "Each Nation bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring the provision of logistic support for its forces allocated to NATO. This may be discharged in a number of ways, including agreements to ensure effective logistics support of the force. Nations retain control of their own resources, until such time as they are released to NATO."<sup>48</sup> Unless the NATO commander is authorized with logistics authority from member nations, he is limited in his ability to prioritize support to the decisive or supporting effort. The only method the NATO commander has to influence logistics is through a multinational integrated logistics unit (MILU). According to AJP-4.6, "A multinational integrated logistics unit (MILU) is formed when once or more nations agree, under operational control (OPCON) of a NATO Commander, to provide logistics support to a multinational force."<sup>49</sup> MILUs work for the MJLC and must have all participating nations agree. The MILU structure in figure 4 under the Maritime component and the MILU organization under

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Support or Bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements that may participate in to ease individual national burdens and achieve operational efficiencies (25 Dec 2002), III-1.

<sup>47</sup>Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine, 1-3.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 1-2, December 2003.

<sup>49</sup>Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Doctrine (MJLC), 3-2.

the NATO force command is confusing. As determined earlier, without a logistics filter for logistics activities, the result is lack of logistics command and control in the JOA. In the *NATO February 2006 Backgrounder* publication, it states, “To achieve economies of scale, NATO is now pooling its logistics resources in the form of standing MILUs. In April 2005, Bulgaria, Canada, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Partnership for Peace member Croatia agreed to form and sustain the first such unit, a Joint Theater Movement Staff (JTMS) MILU.”<sup>50</sup> This is an important move in establishing somewhat fixed NATO support organizations, however, depending on the size of and structure of the MILU, the CJ4 section only has coordinating authority as opposed to command authority regarding logistics decisions. Therefore, since the MJLC is the clearing house for all logistics issues through the CJ4 to the NATO commander, how is logistics planning conducted given the multiple participating nations, each with responsibilities for supporting themselves?

According to MC 319/1, it states, “Logistics support concepts, structures and procedures must be tailored to the respective forces and their employment options...National and NATO logistics planning must be harmonized as early as possible during the operational planning process.”<sup>51</sup> Prior to executing stability operations, the early coordination of each respective nation along with NATO is essential in determining national requirements, and any common user support agreements. The CJ4 is NATO’s logistics planner responsible for synchronizing NATO’s support. According to AJP-4(A), it states, “The CJ4 staff carry the overall responsibility for logistics co-ordination at strategic and JOA level...The ability to plan and conduct support operations in consultation with nations and with necessary levels of coordination and authority for the benefit of the JFC’s plan provides the basis of NATO logistics support.”<sup>52</sup> NATO

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<sup>50</sup>*Logistics Support for NATO Operations- Multinational Units*, Section 9, Multinational Units.

<sup>51</sup>Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference (SNLC), 3-4.

<sup>52</sup>Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine, 1-5.



logistics is “staff centric,” meaning that the command and control, planning and decision making are made by the CJ4 staff (which includes the MJLC), controlling all logistics. In the absence of a logistics commander, who has decision making authority, all decisions must be made by the CJTF commander based on staff recommendations from the CJ4. Participating nations must coordinate with the NATO CJ4 in stead of a logistics commander prior to execution. Figure 5 is an example of a hypothetical NATO logistics support structure in supporting participating Nations.




Figure 5 - Hypothetical MJLC Support to Participating Nations<sup>53</sup>

AJP-4(A) states, “If nations elect to support forces through a national support element, it remains vital, just as in multinational logistics operations that they interface with the NATO

multinational logistics coordination entity.”<sup>54</sup> Figure 5 is a hypothetical MJLC providing support to participating nations. Nations 1-4 are subordinate NATO participating nations. Nations 1 and 2 have opted for participation in a MILU allowing the NATO commander with logistics authority over their national resources through a mutual support arrangement. However, nations 3 and 4 are providing independent logistics support to their respective forces and coordinating with the

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<sup>53</sup>Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Doctrine (MJLC), Figure 3-1.

<sup>54</sup>Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine, 1-9.

CJ4 for logistics tracking and information only. The participating nations report to both thought their respective nations and NATO. The on-going challenge for the NATO commander, according to figure 5 is to maintain positive logistics visibility over Nations 3 and 4 through his CJ4 and Director MJLC. The result is potential lack of visibility of logistics management and redundancy of logistics capability throughout the JOA, specifically, nations ordering the same common stocks shared by other forces. Therefore, how does the MJLC facilitate logistics planning if nations retain authority over their respective logistics resources?

Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Doctrine AJP-4.6 states; “The MJLC is a logistics staff developed to execute the theatre level plans and policies of the CJ4... This is particular importance when it is collocated with or integrated in a HQ in order to ensure a clear delineation of responsibilities...In its simplest form, MJLC nucleus personnel would augment the CJ4 staff to provide the required additional expertise, to co-ordinate and execute logistics policy for the CJ4.”<sup>55</sup> As stated, the most important aspect of the MJLC is that it provides the CJ4 the ability to plan and coordinate logistics policy throughout NATO. The MJLC also has the ability to increase or decrease its structure based on NATO’s task organization. The MJLC is not a logistics headquarters where logistics units are attached under the single control of a commander with a planning staff. NATO logistics planning does not have the luxury of having a logistics commander reporting directly to the NATO commander for resources, but instead to the CJ4. Instead of making critical logistics decisions to the NATO commander, the NATO commander must depend on member nation’s decision authority for all logistics planning. However, NATO commanders may have authority to redistribute logistics resources. NATO policy as stated in *The NATO Logistics Handbook*, “Per MC 319/1 Annex A, NATO Commanders at agreed levels have the authority to redistribute specified logistics assets committed by nations for the support of

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<sup>55</sup>Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Doctrine (MJLC), 2.

the forces under their command.”<sup>56</sup> Although limited, this provides the NATO commander authority to make critical decisions regarding logistics, in the absence of having a logistics commander having been delegated redistribution authority. Since the NATO commander must rely on his logistics staff instead of a logistics commander for critical logistics issues, how does the NATO commander provide for logistics unity of effort during the NATO operations?

Since the MJLC and CJ4 are the decision and logistics planning entity for NATO logistics, unless the MJLC director, partner nations, and CJ4 are synchronized, duplication of the logistics effort is likely to occur. According to AJP-4.6, “Clear delineation of responsibilities will be made between MJLC and components CJ4 in order to ensure that there is no duplication of effort between the logistic co-ordination elements at multiple command levels.”<sup>57</sup> Duplication of effort is not unity of effort. If several Nations decide to provide their forces national logistics support, and unless the CJ4 has ability to influence support, nations will tend to operate independently, thus maintaining redundant logistics stockpiles. This redundancy in logistics stockpiles of the same commodity results in the NATO commander losing logistics visibility in his JOA. MC 319/1 states, “The exchange of information between nations and NATO concerning logistics assets and capabilities is essential for the efficient management and coordination of support to NATO forces.”<sup>58</sup> Therefore, what is another method of how the NATO commander can reduce duplication of logistics resources and achieve unity of effort?

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<sup>56</sup>*NATO Logistics Handbook*, Multinational Logistics–NATO Commanders’ Authority to Redistribute Logistic Resources (October 1997), Chapter 13.

<sup>57</sup>Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Doctrine (MJLC), 3-2.

<sup>58</sup>Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference (SNLC), 3.

AJP-4(A) states that, “Participating nations have the option to develop mutual support arrangements ...by working together and sharing resources (especially services capabilities), nations can achieve economies of scale in their logistics operations.”<sup>59</sup> As previously mentioned, mutual support arrangements are a good source to enable the NATO commander and staff to streamline common logistics support to all forces. However, this is only feasible for specific commodities, due to interoperability issues between nations, such as class IX repair parts for a respective nation’s equipment. Additionally, when more than one nation agrees to mutual support arrangements, it now becomes feasible to establish a multinational integrated logistics unit (MILU). The challenge of this concept is determining the structure, C2, as well as recruiting enough multinational participation.

In summary, NATO logistics doctrine provides a MJLC for logistics command and control. The MJLC is capable of tailoring to a stability operations mission through its ability to increase or decrease its staff. The NATO commander has logistics authority if nations agree to provide NATO with the responsibility of their resources. In the absence of mutually supporting arrangements, the CJ4 has the burden of planning, tracking and providing the logistics visibility of each nations support to the NATO commander. Therefore, during NATO operations, logistics authority is retained with each supporting nation. Logistics planning must be done early in the planning process, and the MJLC along with nations NSC are NATO’s source. Unless NSCs are cooperative, coalition logistics may be operating independently. The sooner the MJLC organizes all nations for logistics planning, the quicker logistics synchronization is accomplished. Unity of effort is achieved through the CJ4 and MJLC’s ability to have mutually supporting arrangements, and participating nations “buy in” to the logistics plan and reporting structure. Mutual support arrangements improve the MJLC ability to provide the NATO commander with a common

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<sup>59</sup>Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine, 1-14.

picture of logistics. Therefore, given the UN and NATO logistics doctrine and structures, how could a US logistics organization (with US as lead nation) benefit from UN and NATO logistics lessons learned?

## **US MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS JOINT TASK FORCE (MLJTF)**

According to JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support for Multinational Operations*, “Unity of command and unity of effort may be more difficult for multinational operations, but realizing these principles will be facilitated through the establishment of a multinational logistics C2 organization that carefully balances the authorities and responsibilities of the multinational force commander and participating nations...Determining the appropriate C2 of multinational logistics operations is the most important step in planning support of multinational operations.”<sup>60</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to analyze US Army evolving logistics doctrine and its applicability to supporting stability operations and then combine the lessons learned from the UN and NATO regarding logistics authority, logistics planning and unity of effort, into a recommended US MLJTF logistics structure.

According to the *US Army’s Modular Logistics Force Concept*, “The Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) is capable of planning, controlling, and synchronizing all support operations for the ASCC or JFC. It provides single logistics command and control in theater, simultaneously providing full spectrum support operations during deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment. It is regionally focused and globally employable and is capable of operating as part of a Joint/combined force. It is capable of deploying multiple Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (ESC) into separate JOAs and providing support to Army and Joint,

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<sup>60</sup>Joint Pub 4-08, vi-vii.




Figure 6 - Expeditionary Sustainment Command<sup>61</sup>

interagency, and multinational forces (JIM).<sup>62</sup> Figure 6 is the command and control structure of the HQ ESC. Under the modular concept, the ESC operates under the C2 of an Army Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). The ESC is a modular organization, capable of deploying independently and has the ability to augment joint/interagency and multinational components. If required to act as the FLSG for a UN stability operation, the ESC could integrate MILUs, UN liaisons and required interagency positions into its organization. If involved in a NATO operation, the ESC could absorb much of the MJLC's resources to manage logistics. However, the ESC is an Army unique organization under the C2 of an Army Headquarters, the TSC. If the US had to support a UN or NATO operation as lead nation, and assuming that US ARFOR made

<sup>61</sup>Richard A. Osterfeld, "CSS Transformation Overview Briefing," *Combat Developer, Multifunctional, Army Concepts*, (2006), 8.

up the majority of forces, its logistics structure must be able to deploy independently and under the operational control (OPCON) of the CJTF in the form of a MLJTF. The author concludes that if properly resourced with Joint, interagency and multinational elements, the ESC could form the basis of the MLJTF. Additionally, by being OPCON to the CJTF headquarters, the command and control relationship would provide the MLJTF the linkage with the CJTF for logistics authority necessary to influence joint logistics. Therefore, how is NATO currently structured in Afghanistan to support stability operations in OEF?

NATO's current ISAF logistics arrangement in Afghanistan provides a good example and lessons learned in supporting multinational partners during stability operations. According to the article, *New Challenges for Transatlantic Security Cooperation*, "NATO did not become involved immediately (in ISAF operations). "Lead" nations first had command of the force, made up of contingents of forces from countries which had volunteered. ISAF was originally led by the UK (December 2001-June 2002) with 19 countries providing support."<sup>62</sup> NATO assumed control of the UK's operation and managed logistics from through a MJLC concept as discussed in Chapter 2. According to the ISAF headquarters diagram in the *ISAF information Brochure*, "The CJ4 falls under the Deputy COS of Support who falls under the ISAF COS....The CJ4 provides the logistics planning, liaison, coordination and reporting for ISAF. CJ4 plans provide logistics input to all long and mid-term activities in the headquarters. Logistics in ISAF is principally a national responsibility but there is always a benefit in cooperation and the staff of the MNLC to facilitate liaison between the many NSEs, regional commands and other

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<sup>62</sup>US Army Combined Arms Support Command, "Modular Force Logistics Concept" (Version 5) Draft, HQ (28 Apr 2007), 12.

<sup>63</sup>Report submitted on behalf of the Political committee by Mrs. Papadimitriou, Rapporteur (Greece, Federated Group). *New Challenges for the Transatlantic Security Operation*. Document A/1877, Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly, 1 Dec 2004.



headquarters.<sup>64</sup> This arrangement, similar to NATO's MJLC concept in Chapter 2, portrays the complexity of managing national systems without a logistics JTF logistics commander. The ISAF Support Division in the ISAF headquarters is a logistics coordinating entity that coordinates and reports logistics activities between Nations. It does not execute logistics operations and is not a logistics command. Therefore, what are some lessons learned from senior leaders regarding ISAFs logistics structure?

In her article *New Challenges for Transatlantic Security Cooperation*, Mrs. Rapporteur states, "The Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, also foresees a Multinational logistics structure instead of each nation providing its own logistics chain."<sup>65</sup> Additionally, in Crystal Raner's article, *NATO Needs to Transform its Logistics Support says Former ISAF Deputy Commander during ACT Visit*, Canadian Major-General Andrew Leslie, Deputy ISAF Commander states, "NATO needs to concentrate on how to accomplish integrated logistics. We are wasting scarce resources by each nation having its own independent supply system. Understandably, there are certain things that you have to keep independent, but in places like far off Kabul, it becomes very self-evident NATO needs to become more logistically integrated."<sup>66</sup> Given the logistics integration challenges as stated by the Deputy ISAF commander, how would a MLJTF organize as part of a US lead contingent that replaced ISAF?

If the US deployed a separate JTF in the form of a MLJTF to replace ISAF operations, was OPCON to the CJTF, and under the command and control of a logistics commander, it could provide the CJTF commander visibility for all theater logistics. Figure 7 depicts the author's US

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<sup>64</sup>ISAF information Brochure, ISAF Press Office, [http://www2.nato.hq.int/ISAF/media/pdf/brochure\\_0806.pdf](http://www2.nato.hq.int/ISAF/media/pdf/brochure_0806.pdf), support Division, page 14-15, 6 August 2006.

<sup>65</sup>Report submitted on behalf of the Political committee by Mrs. Papadimitriou, Rapporteur (Greece, Federated Group). *New Challenges for the Transatlantic Security Operation*. Document A/1877, Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly, 22, 1 Dec 2004.

<sup>66</sup>Crystal M. Rayner, "NATO Needs to Transform its Logistics Support" says Former ISAF Deputy Commander during ACT Visit, HQ SACT, (Norfolk VA: 7 Sept 2004).

MLJTF organizational structure after analyzing the UN and NATO logistics doctrine and structure to stability operations.




Figure 7 - Headquarters MLJTF

The MLJTF is organized with key joint and multinational staff personnel. The headquarters element includes the Commander, either a Brigadier General or Colonel depending on the size of the MLJTF, and includes a chief of staff and Command Sergeants Major (CSM). Additionally, the size of the MLJTF is totally dependent on the size of the stability operations forces, US and multinational. It could be expeditionary in nature, or grow to support a large scale contingency operation. Also, since it's the equivalent of a US military brigade sized headquarters, the commander has his personal staff, to advise him in Joint, and multinational operations, including a political military advisor, under the Deputy Commander. The primary staff includes the J1-J6 to manage joint theater logistics synchronization. Alternatively, on the logistics mission side, the distribution management center (DMC) is the focal point for all JOA logistics. All participating nations in ISAF would have a national support cell with LNOs, as well

as US ARFOR, MARFOR, and USAF representatives under the DMC. Also, subordinate units could include MILUs from participating nations and any required US single service logistics units. In the absence of mutual support arrangements, nations operating independently for logistics would still be required to report through the NSCs to the DMC. The MLJTF commander could work directly with other subordinate TF commanders in the CJTF to solve logistics issues. Given this organizational structure and the lessons from UN and NATO regarding logistics authority, how could the MLJTF exercise logistics authority given current national constraints?

JP 4-0 states, “Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics...Logistics responsibilities for subordinate forces to the combatant command will follow single service command channels...or when the geographic combatant commander gives the commander of a subordinate joint force directive authority for a common support capability within that subordinate commander’s JOA.”<sup>67</sup> Given this information regarding logistics authority, the CJTF commander would retain logistics authority and execute common user logistics authority through the MLJTF commander (through the ARFOR, MARFOR, and USAF LNOs) for all services. Any authority to multinational unit logistics would have to come from mutual support arrangements from respective participating nations, and coordinated through the NSCs. However, according to the author, in the absence of logistics authority, it appears critical to coordinate and encourage coalition partners to agree to mutual support arrangements with the lead nation. The MLJTF commander would execute common user logistics requirements through his distribution management center (DMC). The DMC would maintain visibility and assist in channeling respective service requirements to the CJTF J4. The MLJTF Commander could oversee these logistics requirements by providing the CJTF with positive logistics command and

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<sup>67</sup>Joint Pub 4-0, vi.

control of JOA operations. Obviously, the best case would be for the MLJTF commander to have total logistics authority. What advantages would a separate logistics JTF bring to a CJTF?

By establishing a separate multinational logistics joint task force, and having a logistics JTF task organized under a CJTF, it would enable the logistics operation (MLJTF) to serve as a “supporting effort” to any decisive operations, in support of the CJTF commander’s intent. This streamlining of logistics support through a logistics organization improves the command and control of logistics by having the MLJTF commander prioritizing logistics. Additionally, for US led operations, the US would have the flexibility to hand over a complete logistics organizational staff headquarters to another logistics headquarters that could merely replace the MLJTF HQ by conducting a transition of authority to another lead nation, minimizing any disruption to the logistics effort. Given current US doctrine, how do logisticians conduct logistics planning to accommodate national logistics authority constraints to ensure logistics is synchronized with the CJTF’s plan?

In David Toczek’s article, *Knowing the Rules: Planning Considerations for NATO Operations*, he states in regards to logistics planning, “NATO’s expeditionary role has had a significant second order effect on the concept of national logistics. Because nations can no longer draw on their own pre-positioned stocks within their boundaries, they create their own logistics pipelines from Europe or North America to the theater of operation.”<sup>68</sup> Unlike NATO, the US is used to operating over extended international boundaries. US logistics planners must understand the challenges of their multinational partners when receiving support from pipelines outside of the JOA. Therefore, how could the MLJTF manage out of area logistics pipelines for multinational partners?

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<sup>68</sup>David M. Toczek, “Knowing the Rules: Planning Considerations for NATO Operations” *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2006, 2.

The MLJTF headquarters would have both an operational and logistics planning staff. This planning staff would include representatives from the UN and NATO, multinational partners, liaisons from all US services, PAO, and other unique staff sections and possibly interagency representatives, based on the logistics requirements of each participating nation. US joint and multinational liaisons would synchronize out of area logistics requirements through the MLJTF logistics planners with oversight from the COS. The COS would run the planning section and synchronize both JOA and out of area logistics pipelines of each respective nation. With the COS acting as the operational and logistics planning integrator for the MLJTF, what role would the CJTF (C4) play?

Guidance and policy directives for JOA and out of area logistics requirements would be generated by the CJTF (CJ4). The CJ4 would ensure all administrative and logistics policy directives, mandates etc, are met by the MLJTF commander. JOA and out of area logistics requirements received by the DMC must adhere to CJTF logistics policy directives. The DMC would then receive all logistics requirements, and conduct capabilities and shortfall analysis from

US single service components and each respective NSC. The consolidated logistics status (LOGSTAT) would be sent through the COS to the MLJTF Commander. The MLJTF commander would then provide the LOGSTAT to the CJ4 for the CJTF commander's (logistics authority) approval for implementation of logistics support throughout the JOA. Once the CJTF commander has approved the logistics support recommendation from the MLJTF, how is logistics executed throughout the JOA?

The DMC, who has direct planning and coordinating authority with the CJ4, would be responsible for executing the logistics support plan through the respective liaisons and NSCs in the MLJTF headquarters. The DMC would accomplish this by tracking and maintaining visibility of all theater logistics by maximizing all available logistics tracking technology. Directing and centralizing logistics execution from the DMC, with oversight from the MLJTF commander, streamlines logistics command and control. Also, by having the joint theater distribution and movements section under the DMC, commodity experts and transportation managers can maximize all available transportation assets for disposition of critical supplies. The DMC officer along with the MLJTF operations staff would ensure CJTF forces coordinate force protection, safety and environmental related tasks into all logistics operations. Logistics plans would ultimately be coordinated between the DMC chief and CJ4 for dissemination to all CJTF forces. Concurrent planning by the CJ4 and MLJTF DMC would ensure the MLJTF commander had approved the logistics support plan prior to submitting to the CJTF commander, thus setting the conditions for unity of effort across the JOA. Therefore, how would the MLJTF achieve unity of effort after assuming the ISAF mission?

In her *Article NATO Needs to Transform its Logistics Support says Former ISAF Deputy Commander during ACT Visit*, author Crystal Raner states, "Topping MG Leslie's list of observations from his six month tour as ISAF deputy commander was NATO's excessive duplication of logistics efforts. He highlighted the insufficient ratio of troops to support seen in

national contributions, and argued that this could be significantly reduced by integrating logistics support.”<sup>69</sup> The MLJTF could facilitate unity of effort across multiple lines of operations by acting as a logistics hub for theater logistics, as opposed to a JOA with multiple independent logistics areas with no joint theater logistics visibility. Additionally, by having a single logistics hub, the joint distribution and movement section of the DMC could identify unique transportation requirements and maximize efficiencies in terms of inter and intra transportation support. Also, given the nature of stability operations with multiple entry points into a non-contiguous battlefield, there are multiple support hubs with activities on-going in separate national sectors. Due to this dispersion of forces, and unless logistics is consolidated, nations’ logistics will continue to operate separately as single nations or volunteer to contribute as part of a multinational integrated logistics unit (MILU). Given national authority constraints, encouraging participating nations to participate in mutual support arrangements would at least give the CJTF commander limited authority over national logistics, thus improving logistics management in the long-term. Regardless if nations operate logistics independent as a single nation or participate in a MILUs under a MLJTF, the CJTF still requires a single logistics operator (commander) responsible for managing all logistics. Regardless, both require a single logistics coordinator or commander responsible for managing logistics in their respective areas. These commanders and logisticians would report the logistics status to the MLJTF DMC, through their logistics representatives in on the MLJTF staff. The importance of this reporting method with regards to unity of effort is that it provides the MLJTF commander with visibility over all logistics stockpiles and the identification and monitoring common user logistics in the JOA. Additionally, logistics connectivity could be allocated throughout the JOA to support coalition partners. Given the lessons learned from ISAF and the US military’s commitment to the war on terror, US

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<sup>69</sup>Rayner. 1.

military logisticians must be prepared to determine the optimal logistics structures required to support stability operations.

The MLJTF organization is an optimal US logistics structure designed to maximize logistics authority, planning and unity of effort across the JOA. It could provide US logistics planners a method for supporting a US led CJTF during future stability operations.

## CONCLUSION

The *2004 Logistics Dimensions* Air Force Journal quotes from a DLA fact sheet which states, “Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom were prime examples of how coalitions dramatically increase combat power and lead to a rapid and favorable outcome to the conflict. We need to refine multinational logistics doctrine and procedures to optimize our operations in an international environment characterized by new challenges.”<sup>70</sup> As the author previously stated, the purpose of this monograph is to provide US logisticians a more joint, multinational, multi-agency, streamlined logistics organization, designed to provide the CJTF commander with positive logistics command and control for future stability operations. Therefore, based on the findings from UN and NATO stability operations logistics doctrine, what does the author recommend as the optimal US support structure?

The ESC headquarters in figure 6, modified into the MLJTF headquarters in figure 7, is the author’s recommended future support structure for the Army / Joint force. The ESC headquarters could be easily tailored as a MLJTF headquarters. For command and control, the MLJTF would remain assigned under a regional TSC, and attached to a CJTF until the US transitioned lead nation to another nation. The new lead nation would then assume command of

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<sup>70</sup>*2004 Logistics Dimensions: Readings in the issues and concerns facing Air Force Logisticians in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* – Volume 1, Air Force Logistics Management Agency, page 100. Quote from DLA fact sheet, “June 03 (online) available: [http://www.DLA.mil/public\\_info/printer\\_friendly.asp](http://www.DLA.mil/public_info/printer_friendly.asp) , 5 Dec 03.



the existing MLJTF and modify accordingly. The MLJTF headquarters, if properly resourced with joint, interagency, and multinational personnel, could then transition with other nations and be prepared to downsize based on the supported population. Therefore, the MLJTF could provide the CJTF commander a mechanism for executing logistics authority, logistics planning and most importantly unity of effort, as previously analyzed in this monograph.

The MLJTF commander could facilitate the CJTF commander in executing logistics authority by streamlining logistics planning, preparation and execution through a separate logistics headquarters, as previously examined in the UN FLSG model. This is contrary to NATO's MJLC's concept of logistics management. Under NATO, logistics is managed by the NATO CJ4 with augmentees from the MJLC. Other than staff management and tracking of logistics in the JOA, NATO's MJLC concept has no logistics commander, and therefore assumes no ownership of logistics throughout the JOA. The author recommends a separate logistics unit under a logistics commander who is responsible for logistics operations in the JOA. The MLJTF is structured to provide the CJTF commander with joint theater visibility of logistics. Since the CJTF commander is responsible for the execution of logistics authority, what does the author recommend regarding the MLJTF ability to conduct logistics planning?

As analyzed, the UN and NATO provide logistics planning through the FLSG (UN) concept and NATO CJ4 (includes MJLC). The author recommends that logistics planning be a concurrent planning process conducted by the CJTF C4 and MLJTF commander and staff (specifically the DMC). The CJTF C4 directs joint theater logistics policy, while the MLJTF commander and staff provide the CJTF commander a mechanism for executing the CJTF commander's logistics intent and policies. Additionally, since the MLJTF is staffed with joint and multinational personnel, national interest as well as joint considerations are included the planning process. For example, since logistics planning is centralized in the DMC section of the MLJTF, critical transportation requirements (such as in and out of country strategic lift

requirements) may be deconflicted at MLJTF level prior to receiving CJTF commander's approval. Therefore, how does the process of conducting concurrent logistics planning by the CJTF CJ4 and MLJTF commander and staff facilitate unity of effort across the JOA.

As examined, achieving logistics unity of effort during stability operations is critical since it provides the CJTF commander a common picture of logistics in his JOA. The author recommends that the MLJTF facilitates unity of effort by filtering joint and theater logistics through a separate logistics unit, resourced to determine requirements, balance capabilities and ultimately solve shortfalls amongst joint and multinational elements. The MLJTF achieves unity of effort by promoting MSAs and MILUs that provide the CJTF commander with all, if not limited logistics authority over participating nations. Even in the absence of MSAs or MILUs, the mere ability of the MLJTF to track on hand and available common stocks throughout the JOA (from information provided by NSCs in the DMC), reduces duplication of effort. Lastly, the MLJTF achieves unity of effort by controlling and monitoring stockpiles of commodities, thus providing the CJTF commander the ability to prioritize logistics for a particular mission or operation. The synchronizing of logistics through a separate logistics unit provides the CJTF commander the ability to achieve logistics unity of effort by monitoring all logistics operations in the JOA.

The MLJTF concept is but a way to think about future logistics support, which is tailored to bridge UN and NATO gaps in supporting coalition forces operating under different doctrines. By providing the CJTF commander a separate logistics JTF, it allows him to delegate logistics command and control to a single commander responsible for synchronizing theater logistics. This monograph provides future Army / joint planners a method of providing support to multifunctional stability operations. The MLJTF is the optimal logistics JTF designed to support future CJTF operations.

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